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This paper presents functional MRI work on emotional processing in depersonalization
disorder (DPD). This relatively neglected disorder is hallmarked by a disturbing change
in the quality of first-person experience, almost invariably encompassing a diminished
sense of self and an alteration in emotional experience such that the sufferer feels
less emotionally reactive, with emotions experienced as decreased or “damped down,”
so that emotional life seems to lack spontaneity and subjective validity. Here we
explored responses to emotive visual stimuli to examine the functional neuroanatomy
of emotional processing in DPD before and after pharmacological treatment. We also
employed concurrent skin conductance measurement as an index of autonomic arousal.
In common with previous studies we demonstrated that in DPD, there is attenuated
psychophysiological response to emotional material, reflected in altered patterns of (i)
regional brain response, (ii) autonomic responses. By scanning participants before and
after treatment we were able to build on previous findings by examining the changes
in functional MRI response in patients whose symptoms had improved at time 2.
The attenuation of emotional experience was associated with reduced activity of the
insula, whereas clinical improvement in DPD symptoms was associated with increased
insula activity. The insula is known to be implicated in interoceptive awareness and the
generation of feeling states. In addition an area of right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
emerged as particularly implicated in what may be “top-down” inhibition of emotional
responses. The relevance of these findings to the wider study of emotion, self-related
processes, and interoception is discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Depersonalization disorder (DPD) is characterized by a persistent and distressing alteration
in the quality of subjective experience, such that the individual experiences both themselves
(depersonalization) and their surroundings (derealization) as oddly estranged and unreal.
Although depersonalization and derealization are separable phenomena, in practice they usually
co-occur (Sierra and David, 2011). In recent years there has been a growing appreciation that
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the phenomenology of DPD entails a sense of alienation
and estrangement from experience in general, and in keeping
with this, DPD patients often describe a reduced capacity for
emotional response and a generalized reduction in the experience
of bodily sensation. In phenomenological literature, the terms
“de-affectualization” and “de-somatization” have been applied
to these aspects of the condition. Two large factor analyses
(Sierra et al., 2005; Simeon et al., 2008) of DPD symptomatology
have confirmed emotional numbing (i.e., “de-affectualization”)
as a key symptom domain in DPD. There are sound theoretical
reasons for believing that this alteration in emotional experience
is central to the condition (Medford, 2012), and it is very rare to
encounter a patient who fulfills criteria for a diagnosis of DPD but
does not describe this deficit of subjective emotional response.
A number of previous fMRI and psychophysiological studies
of DPD have focused specifically on this emotional aspect of
the condition, showing that autonomic response to emotionally
salient visual stimuli is significantly reduced in DPD (Sierra et al.,
2002), and that the changes in regional brain activity seen in
response to emotional stimuli in healthy controls are largely
absent in DPD (Phillips et al., 2001; Medford et al., 2006). These
findings can be seen as plausible biological correlates of the
subjective deficit of emotional experience described by patients
with DPD (Medford, 2012).
In this study, patients with primary DPD were studied using
an emotional vs. neutral block-design fMRI paradigm employed
in an earlier imaging study of DPD (Phillips et al., 2001), utilizing
stimuli drawn from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS, Bradley and Lang, 1999). The IAPS is a library of images
that have been given normative ratings for emotional salience
and arousal and which are widely used in emotion research.
Patients were scanned before and after receiving pharmacological
treatment (lamotrigine) specifically tailored to DPD (Sierra et al.,
2001, 2006). Thus patients were scanned twice at two different
time points (14 patients scanned at time 1, of whom 10 were re-
scanned at time 2). The idea of this approach is twofold: scanning
at time 1 represents an attempt to replicate previous findings,
in a group of as yet untreated (i.e., medication-free) patients
with DPD. Given the paucity of literature on this condition, it is
important to attempt this kind of replication in order to explore
the robustness of previous findings. Secondly, re-scanning at
time 2 allows an assessment of the effects of pharmacological
treatment on the neural response to emotional stimuli in this
patient group, and how this relates to changes in clinical state.
Specific hypotheses were as follows:
1. That functional MRI results in DPD patients at time 1 would
essentially replicate previous findings using IAPS images in a
DPD patient group (Phillips et al., 2001) in showing a reduced
response to emotionally salient stimuli, and a relative lack of
difference in the response to emotional material compared
to neutral. More specifically, it was predicted that right
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 47) would be
significantly activated in the emotional phase in DPD patients
at time 1, but not in the controls, as in the Phillips et al.
study. It was also predicted that healthy controls would show
a response to emotional images characterized by significant
activation in the emotional phase in areas known to be
involved in emotional processing, specifically anterior insula,
and sensory (in this case visual) cortex activation related to
modulation of sensory cortex by affective processing.
2. That at time 2, DPD patients reporting a significant reduction
in their symptoms would show a pattern of neural responses to
emotional stimuli more akin to that seen in healthy controls,
whereas those reporting no such reduction would continue
to show a response pattern similar to that seen at time 1. In
particular, because of prior work implicating underactivity of
the anterior insula in DPD (discussed in detail below), we
hypothesized that DPD patients who had improved clinically
would at time 2 show significantly increased activation,
compared to time 1, of anterior insula in response to
emotional material.
3. That DPD patients would show generally reduced skin
conductance responses (SCRs) to IAPS stimuli compared to
healthy controls, and that at time 2 this effect would be
influenced by response to treatment in a similar manner to the
fMRI findings i.e., that DPD patients who improved clinically
would, at time 2, have an SCR profile resembling that seen
in controls, with significantly more autonomic response to
emotional stimuli than in the same patients at time 1 or
non-improved patients at time 2.
The key hypothesis, in its simplest form, was that patients
who show a significant response to treatment [defined as a
30% or greater reduction in Cambridge Depersonalization
State Scale (CDSS) scores at time 2 relative to time 1 (Sierra
et al., 2001, 2006), accompanied by subjective reported
improvement at clinical follow-up] would also show a
concomitant change in their neural and physiological response
patterns.
PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS
Fourteen adult patients were recruited from the
Depersonalization Clinic at the Maudsley Hospital. Every
patient had a diagnostic assessment performed by a psychiatrist
experienced in the evaluation and treatment of DPD (either
NM or MS). Patients were recruited according to the following
inclusion and exclusion criteria: (1) Meeting diagnostic criteria
for primary DPD. Where other psychopathology (e.g., anxiety)
was present, it was a requirement that this was secondary
to chronic depersonalization, such that the latter was the
predominant presenting symptom, and had been the dominant
symptom for the duration of the condition (Medford et al.,
2005). (2) On no psychotropic medication. Where patients had
previously been on such medication, it was a study requirement
that they had been medication-free for at least 6 months.
However, toward the end of the study period, after four patients
had dropped out of the study for various reasons, a decision
was taken to include two further patients who were already on
conventional antidepressant medication at time 1 (fluoxetine
and venlafaxine, respectively). (3) Suitability for lamotrigine
treatment, and having given informed consent for this treatment.
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(4) No contra-indication to MRI scanning, and willingness to
undergo scanning on two separate occasions. (5) No history of
other psychiatric or neurological illness.
All patients gave informed consent, and were told they were
free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to
give any reason. Patients were further informed that declining
to participate in, or withdrawing from, the study, would have
no bearing on the nature or duration of their clinical care. The
study had ethical approval from the relevant university and UK
National Health Service review boards.
Fourteen patients with DPD satisfying entry criteria gave
informed consent to participate (11 male, 3 female, age range
23–59, mean 33.7, SD 8.9). Estimated verbal IQ, assessed using
the NART (National Adult Reading Test, Nelson, 1982) ranged
from 103 to 127, mean 115, SD 7.79. Duration of DPD symptoms
ranged from 2 to over 40 years, mean 15 years, SD 11.42. In
other words all cases were highly chronic. Psychiatric symptoms
were quantified using the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale
(CDS, Sierra and Berrios, 2000), the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI, Beck et al., 1988), and the Spielberger Anxiety Inventory
(SAI; Spielberger, 1983). The CDS is a self-report scale in
which respondents are asked to rate the frequency and duration
of depersonalization-related experiences over the preceding 6
months (Sierra and Berrios, 2000). Because we were interested in
changes between two time points, rather than symptoms over a 6
month period, we used an adapted “state” version of the CDS, i.e.,
CDSS, comprising 22 depersonalization-related statements (e.g.,
Things around me are now looking ’flat’ or ’lifeless’, as if I were
looking at a picture). Each statement is rated on a simple visual
analog scale between 0 and 100, such that the maximum possible
score is (22 × 100) = 2200. The BDI is a widely used instrument
for probing mood state and other mental and behavioral aspects
of relevance to depression, and SAI is another widely used
anxiety scale that has two sections, one probing anxiety-related
experiences over the preceding 6 months (Trait), and one asking
respondents to rate feelings or experiences in the moment (State)
(Spielberger, 1983).
Participants underwent the first fMRI scanning session prior
to commencing treatment with lamotrigine, which was initiated
at the dose of 25 mg per day and then slowly increased in
fortnightly increments (Medford et al., 2005). Provided there
were no adverse events related to treatment, they remained on
this medication for a sufficient period to reach a target dose in
the range 200–400 mg per day. It was not felt realistic or desirable
to specify that all participants should be on the same target dose,
as previous clinical experience with using lamotrigine for DPD
strongly suggests that, when lamotrigine is effective, the dose at
which it exerts optimal therapeutic effect varies widely between
individuals (as is true for many drugs used to treat psychiatric
conditions; Sierra et al., 2006).
Four patients reported that the DPD symptoms had originally
arisen in the immediate aftermath of illicit drug use [cannabis
in three cases, MDMA (“Ecstasy”) in the fourth, see Table 1]. It
was not felt that this represented a significant confound, as those
who described drug use preceding the onset of symptoms were
otherwise inexperienced drug users who had avoided all illicit
drugs since the first appearance of DPD symptoms. Moreover,
in every case the episode of drug use was so far in the past as
to make it very likely that, even if drug effects had played a
role in the initial experience of depersonalization, the ongoing
maintenance of the depersonalized state was due to psychological
and biological processes underpinning DPD in general, rather
than any distinct “drug-induced” variety of the condition. There
is strong empirical evidence to support this assumption, from a
study demonstrating that the course, nature and phenomenology
of DPD is highly consistent irrespective of whether drug use was
involved at onset (Medford et al., 2003).
Of the original clinical sample of 14, four patients did
not return for scans at time 2 (see Table 1). Two of these
four withdrew from the study soon after their time 1 scans,
deciding that they did not wish to take psychotropic medication.
One patient experienced persistent nausea after commencing
lamotrigine and stopped taking it after a week. The fourth patient
took lamotrigine as described and then contacted the clinic to say
she felt her DPD symptoms had been completely abolished by it,
and that she no longer needed to be seen, and did not wish to
attend for the second scan as she lived a considerable distance
from the clinic.
At time 2, the 10 remaining patients were classified either as
“improved” or “not improved” on the basis of clinical assessment
and their scores on the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale,
state version (CDSS, see Table 1). In keeping with previous
work (Sierra et al., 2001, 2006), clinical improvement was
defined as a reduction of at least 30% in CDSS score between
time 1 and time 2, with percentage change calculated by the
formula [(Time 1 CDSS score–Time 2 CDSS score)/Time 1 CDSS
score] × 100. In every case, the categorisation as “improved” or
“not improved” was corroborated by descriptions of symptoms
and general mental state given by patients at clinical interview.
Using this method, five of the 10 patients were classified as
“improved” and five as “non-improved.” This 50% improvement
rate is consistent with previous work examining lamotrigine as
a potential treatment for DPD (Sierra et al., 2001, 2006). At
this point it should be stressed that the current study does not
represent a formal clinical trial of lamotrigine- aside from the
small numbers, the study was not placebo-controlled or blinded,
so the clinical improvement observed in some patients cannot be
confidently ascribed to the effects of lamotrigine. Nevertheless, it
is of note that placebo effects appear to beminimal inDPD (Sierra
et al., 2001; Simeon et al., 2004), something particularly relevant
here, given that patients had been experiencing symptoms for a
prolonged period and in most cases had tried other psychotropic
drug treatments (usually SSRIs) prior to referral to the DPD
clinic, without any significant impact on their DPD symptoms.
In addition to the patient group, 25 healthy control subjects
(14 male, 11 female) were also recruited (age range 23–46, mean
29.8, SD 5.68; estimated verbal IQ 107–127, mean 117.5, SD 5.47).
Mean symptom scale scores for the control group were: CDSS
38.7 (SD 48.0), BDI 2.56 (2.73), SSAI 31.6 (SD 8.61).
Although the patient group contained relatively more males
(11 M, 3 F vs. 14 M, 11 F), the difference in the gender
composition of the two groups was not statistically significant
(chi-square value 1.99, df = 1, p = 0.16). Unpaired t-tests were
performed to check for other differences between the groups.
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TABLE 1 | Patients at time 1 and time 2: rating scale measures, medication at time 2, and improvement status (1 = improved, 2 = not improved).
Time 1 Medication (at time 2, daily dose) Time 2 % change in CDSS score Improved?
BDI SSAI CDSS Timelag (days) BDI SSAI CDS (State)
1 1 26 475 180 Lamotrigine 400 mg 0 26 140 −70.5 1
2 27 58 780 242 Lamotrigine 400 mg 30 66 1175 +50.6 2
3 1 39 985 180 Lamotrigine 300 mg 3 31 615 −37.6 1
4 6 38 295 154 Lamotrigine 200 mg 10 46 285 −3.4 2
5 15 47 700 – – – – – – –
6 14 42 520 – – – – – – –
7 3 32 589 223 Lamotrigine 400 mg 4 37 237 −59.8 1
8 4 44 685 221 Lamotrigine 250 mg 4 55 344 −49.8 1
9 21 54 1355 – – – – – – –
10 10 57 591 – – – – – – –
11 6 29 467 127 Lamotrigine 250 mg 11 27 564 +20.8 2
12 18 50 1007 119 Lamotrigine 400 mg 17 53 1608 +59.7 2
Venlafaxine 75 mg
13 9 47 529 205 Lamotrigine 400 mg 9 46 588 +11.2 2
14 7 37 696 158 Lamotrigine 300 mg 5 22 260 −62.6 1
Fluoxetine 20 mg
Mean 10.14 42.86 691.00 180.9 – 9.3 40.9 581.6 – –
SD 7.86 10.03 272.42 41.74 – 8.77 14.58 467.70 – –
Timelag, number of days between time 1 and time 2; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; SSAI, Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory; DES, Dissociative Experiences Scale; CDS, Cambridge
Depersonalization Scale (State Version). All 14 patients were scanned at time 1. Time 2 columns indicate which patients were subsequently re-scanned (10 of 14).
TABLE 2 | Group comparisons on SCR variables: controls vs. DPD
patients (at time 1).
SC Measure Group Mean rank Sum of ranks U p
WEflucs NC 22.22 555.5 119.5 0.052
DPDt1 16.04 224.5
WEamp NC 22.62 565.5 109.5 0.027*
DPDt1 15.32 214.5
WEmean NC 22.24 556.0 119.0 0.052
DPDt1 16.00 224.0
E1flucs NC 21.84 546.0 129.0 0.087
DPDt1 16.71 234.0
E1amp NC 22.24 556.0 119.0 0.049*
DPDt1 16.00 224.0
E1mean NC 22.28 557.0 118.0 0.049*
DPDt1 15.93 223.0
N1flucs NC 23.70 592.5 82.5 0.002*
DPDt1 13.39 187.5
N1amp NC 24.40 610.0 65.0 <0.001*
DPDt1 12.14 170.0
N1mean NC 22.12 553.0 122.0 0.062
DPDt1 16.21 227.0
P-values corrected for exactness within SPSS. P-values marked *represent findings
significant at a threshold of p = 0.05.
There were no significant differences between groups for age
(t= 1.66, df= 37, p= 0.11) or estimated verbal IQ (t=−1.18, df
= 37, p= 0.24). There were highly significant differences between
TABLE 3 | Areas of significantly greater activation in response to aversive
images (upper part of table) and neutral images (lower part) in normal
control subjects (n = 25).
No. of voxels x y z Region Side
AREAS ACTIVATED BY EMOTIONAL > NEUTRAL
48 43 −59 −24 Cerebellum R
37 36 −78 −13 BA18 Secondary visual cortex R
25 −43 −70 −7 BA19 Secondary visual cortex L
23 −40 −67 −29 Cerebellum L
18 40 7 20 BA44 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex R
14 −36 7 26 BA44 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L
10 40 22 −2 Anterior insula R
8 51 −44 37 BA40 supramarginal gyrus R
6 −51 19 20 BA45 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L
AREAS ACTIVATED BY NEUTRAL > EMOTIONAL
66 −14 −52 −29 Cerebellum L
45 −58 −22 −7 BA21 middle temporal gyrus L
23 47 −52 37 BA40 supramarginal gyrus R
BA, Brodmann Area.
groups on the three clinical rating scales: the BDI (t = 4.41, df =
37, p < 0.001), the SSAI (t = 3.71, df = 37, p = 0.001), and the
CDSS (t = 11.89, df= 37, p < 0.001).
Experimental Procedure and Data Analysis
Subjects underwent fMRI scanning during which they viewed
alternating blocks of neutral and aversive images selected
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FIGURE 1 | Normal control group map. (A) Transverse slice at z = −2 showing activation in R anterior insula. (B) Transverse slices at z = 16, 24, 32, 40 showing
bilateral activation in DLPFC and occipital cortex. All areas significantly more activated by viewing aversive images compared to neutral images (i.e., in emotional
phase).
TABLE 4 | Areas of significantly greater activation in response to aversive
images (upper part of table) and neutral images (lower part) in patients
with DPD at time1 (n = 14).
Size x y z Region Side
AREAS ACTIVATED By EMOTIONAL > NEUTRAL
38 43 7 20 BA44 DLPFC R
36 43 −70 7 BA37 primary visual cortex R
32 0 22 26 BA 24/32 anterior cingulate cortex R
29 −4 26 20 BA24 anterior cingulate cortex L
28 40 4 26 BA44 DLPFC R
27 43 19 15 BA 44/45 DLPFC R
21 0 22 31 BA32 anterior cingulate cortex R
17 −43 −70 −2 BA19/37 primary visual cortex L
15 40 30 −7 BA47 VLPFC R
13 −7 52 15 BA9 medial prefrontal cortex L
11 40 30 9 BA 45/46 DLPFC R
AREAS ACTIVATED BY NEUTRAL > EMOTIONAL
224 58 −15 −13 BA21 middle temporal gyrus R
BA, Brodmann Area; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
from the IAPS (Bradley and Lang, 1999). Each block of
aversive or neutral images lasted 30 s and comprised five
pictures, onscreen for 6 s each. Subjects were informed during
the consent procedure that some images were potentially
unpleasant or shocking, but were not given details as to
the purpose of the experiment. For each image, subjects
were asked to press a button to indicate whether the scene
depicted was taking place outdoors or indoors. This simple
task ensures cognitive processing of the stimulus image but
does not involve explicit judgements of emotional arousal
or salience: rather, the emotional processing is implicit. This
is the same procedure used in our earlier fMRI study of
depersonalization disorder utilizing IAPS images (Phillips et al.,
2001).
During each scanning session, SCR was recorded
continuously using standard silver-silver chloride electrodes
0.5 cm in diameter. Electrodes were attached to the first and
second fingertips of the nondominant hand. All electrodes and
cables were MR-compatible, allowing concurrent SCR recording
during the fMRI scanning sessions. Using a skin conduction
coupler, analog-to-digital conversion, and preamplification, the
signal was processed by a PSYLAB (Cambridge, MA) SC5SA
preamplifier, a SC5AL amplifier, and real-time PSYLAB online
signal processing software. These devices employ a 24-bit
A/D converter, filter the response signal at 10 Hz to prevent
aliasing, and have an output range of 0–100 MicroSiemens.
SCR was then sampled at 100 Hz without further compression
and stored oﬄine serially, including stimulus presentation
points. Security measures were included to prevent electric
shocks, radiofrequency (RF) burning, and to protect SCL
signals from scanner-induced magnetic distortion using
screened cables. Shielding of the wires received a 5.6-kOhm
correction by resistors that produced a stable 1% shift of
the signal. The cable was led from the magnetically shielded
scanner environment through a Faraday cage, and the signal
filtered at 1000 pF by capacitors to a copper cap before
signal processing. Water soluble jelly (KY Jelly; Johnson
and Johnson, Slough, England) was used as an electrolyte
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FIGURE 2 | Group data for all DPD patients at time 1. (A) Transverse slices at level z = 18, 29 showing activations in emotional phase in bilateral visual cortex,
right VLPFC, and bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (including ACC bilaterally). (B) Midline sagittal slice (i.e., x = 0) showing location of medial prefrontal activation.
contact medium between electrodes and skin. Before the
application of electrodes, all subjects washed their hands
using a plain nonabrasive soap (as in Sierra et al., 2002) in
order to standardize the dermo-gel-electrode interface across
subjects as far as possible. During scanning, participants
underwent approximately 12 min of structural scans prior to
the commencement of the functional MRI experimental runs,
allowing adequate time for habituation of SCR once in the
scanning environment.
fMRI Hardware and Data Acquisition
Gradient echo echoplanar images were acquired on a GE Signa
1.5 T Neurovascular system (General Electric, Milwaukee, WI,
USA) at the Maudsley Hospital, London. One hundred T2∗-
weighted images depicting BOLD (blood oxygenation level
dependent) contrast (Ogawa et al., 1990) were acquired over 5
min (for each task) at each of 14 near-axial non-contiguous 5-mm
thick planes parallel to the intercommissural (AC-PC) line: TE 40
ms, TR 3 s, in-plane resolution 5 mm, and interslice gap 0.5 mm.
This EPI dataset provided complete coverage of the temporal
lobes and almost complete coverage of the frontal, occipital, and
parietal lobes (Simmons et al., 1999).
fMRI data were analyzed with the software XBAM, developed
at the Institute of Psychiatry, using a non-parametric approach
(see Fusar-Poli et al., 2010, for further discussion of this method
and comparison with parametric mapping). Data were first
TABLE 5 | Areas of significantly greater activation in response to aversive
images and neutral images in those DPD patients who at time 2 exhibited
a significant decrease in CDSS score (n = 5).
Size x y z Region Side
AREAS ACTIVATED BY EMOTIONAL > NEUTRAL
45 22 −81 −7 BA18 visual cortex R
38 29 −63 −29 Cerebellum R
37 −22 −74 −29 Cerebellum L
32 −7 −89 −13 BA17 lingual gyrus/visual cortex L
29 −43 19 −7 Anterior insula/BA47 L
26 −51 19 9 BA45 L
19 −32 30 4 Anterior insula L
11 −47 19 20 BA45 DLPFC L
9 −40 0 31 BA44 DLPFC L
AREAS ACTIVATED BY NEUTRAL > EMOTIONAL
455 14 −52 −29 Cerebellum R
processed (Bullmore et al., 1999a) to minimize motion related
artifacts. A 3D volume consisting of the average intensity at
each voxel over the whole experiment was calculated and used
as a template. The 3D image volume at each timepoint was
then realigned to this template by computing the combination
of rotations (around the x, y, and z axes) and translations (in
x, y, and z) that maximized the correlation between the image
intensities of the volume in question and the template. Following
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FIGURE 3 | DPD patients at time 2: group data for improvers (n = 5) only. Transverse slices at levels z = −8, −2, 6, showing activations in emotional phase in
visual cortex bilaterally, and left anterior insula extending into DLPFC.
TABLE 6 | Areas of significantly greater activation in response to aversive
images and neutral images in those DPD patients who at time 2 did not
exhibit a significant decrease in CDSS score (n = 5).
Size x y z Region Side
AREAS ACTIVATED BY EMOTIONAL > NEUTRAL
74 36 −67 −18 Cerebellum R
64 51 −63 −13 BA19/37 visual cortex R
40 −40 −67 −24 Cerebellum L
36 47 −67 −2 BA19 visual cortex R
34 −43 −70 −7 BA19/37 visual cortex L
26 43 30 15 BA45, DLPFC R
14 43 30 −7 BA47, VLPFC R
AREAS ACTIVATED BY NEUTRAL > EMOTIONAL
87 −25 −33 −29 Cerebellum L
realignment, data were then smoothed using a Gaussian filter
(FWHM 7.2 mm) to improve the signal to noise characteristics
of the images.
Responses to the experimental paradigms were then detected
by first convolving each component of the experimental design
with each of two gamma variate functions (peak responses at
4 and 8 s, respectively). The best fit between the weighted sum
of these convolutions and the time series at each voxel was
computed using a constrained BOLD effect model (Friman et al.,
2003) This reduces the possibility of the model fitting procedure
giving rise to mathematically plausible but physiologically
implausible results. Following computation of the model fit, a
goodness of fit statistic was computed. This consisted of the
ratio of the sum of squares of deviations from the mean image
intensity (over the whole time series) due to the model to the
sum of squares of deviations due to the residuals (SSQratio).
This statistic is used to overcome the problem inherent in the
use of the F (variance ratio) statistic that the residual degrees
of freedom are often unknown in fMRI time series due to the
presence of colored noise in the signal. It has also been shown to
behave equivalently to F under permutation testing (Edgington,
1995).
Following computation of the observed SSQratio at each
voxel, the data are permuted by a wavelet-based method
(Bullmore et al., 2001). Repeated application of this method
at each voxel followed by recomputation of the SSQratio
from the permuted data allows (by combination of results
over all intracerebral voxels) the data-driven calculation of the
null distribution of SSQratios under the assumption of no
experimentally determined response. Using this distribution it
is possible to calculate the critical value of SSQratio needed
to threshold the maps at any desired type I error rate. In
addition, detection of activated voxels is extended from voxel
to cluster level (Bullmore et al., 1999b). In addition to the
SSQratio, the size of the BOLD response to each experimental
condition is computed for each individual at each voxel
as a percentage of the mean resting image intensity level.
In order to calculate the BOLD effect size, the difference
between the maximum and minimum values of the fitted
model for each condition is expressed as a percentage of the
mean image intensity level over the whole time series. The
observed and permuted SSQratio maps for each individual,
as well as the BOLD effect size maps are transformed into
the standard space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) using a
two stage warping procedure (Brammer et al., 1997). This
involves first computing the average image intensity map
for each individual over the course of the experiment. The
transformations required to map this image to the structural
scan for each individual and then from “structural space” to
the Talairach template are then computed by maximizing the
correlation between the images at each stage. The SSQratio
and BOLD effect size maps are then transformed into Talairach
space using these transformations. Group activation maps are
then computed by determining the median SSQratio at each
voxel (over all individuals) in the observed and permuted
data maps (medians are used to minimize outlier effects).
The distribution of median SSQratios over all intracerebral
voxels from the permuted data is then used to derive the null
distribution of SSQratios and can be thresholded to produce
group activation maps at any desired voxel or cluster-level
type I error rate. Cluster level maps are thresholded at < 1
expected type I error cluster per brain. The computation of
a standardized measure of effect SSQratio at the individual
level, followed by analysis of the median SSQratio maps
over all individuals treats intra and inter subject variations
in effect separately, constituting a mixed effect approach to
analysis.
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FIGURE 4 | DPD patients at time 2, group data for non-improvers (n = 5). Transverse slices at z = 20, 28, 36 showing activations in emotional phase in bilateral
visual cortex and right DLPFC.
TABLE 7 | Comparison between controls and DPD patients at time 1.
Size x y z Region Side p
CONTROLS > DPD PATIENTS
70 47 −63 −2 BA19 2viscx R 0.005
55 −43 −67 −13 BA19 2vis cx L 0.006
DPD PATIENTS > CONTROLS
27 40 4 20 BA44 DLPFC R 0.037
26 0 22 31 BA32 ACC R/L 0.039
All activations shown were in the emotional phase. 2vis cx, secondary visual cortex;
DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex.
Comparisons of responses between groups or experimental
conditions were performed by fitting the data at each intraceberal
voxel at which all subjects have non-zero data using a linear
model of the type (Y = a + bX + e) where Y is the vector of
BOLD effect sizes for each individual, X is the contrast matrix
for the particular inter condition/group contrasts required,
a is the mean effect across all individuals in the various
conditions/groups, b is the computed group/condition difference
and e is a vector of residual errors. The model is fitted by
minimizing the sum of absolute deviations rather than the sums
of squares to reduce outlier effects. The null distribution of
b is computed by permuting data between conditions/groups
(assuming the null hypothesis of no effect of experimental
condition or group membership) and refitting the above model.
Group difference maps are computed as described above at
voxel or cluster level by appropriate thresholding of the null
distribution of b. BOLD effect maps were used to compute
significant group/condition differences rather than standardized
measures such as SSQratio, F or t as these contain explicit
noise components (error SSQ or error variance), raising the
possibility that group differences resulting from F, SSQratio or




All subjects scored >95% correct responses when judging
whether scenes depicted in IAPS images were taking place
outdoors or indoors, with no difference between the groups.
Skin Conductance Response (SCR) Data
Group Comparisons: All Controls (n = 25) vs. DPD
Patients at Time 1 (n = 14)
The following variables were examined: number of fluctuations
(amplitude of over 0.02 microsiemens), amplitude of the largest
fluctuation, and mean SCL (skin conductance level) across
the epoch. These variables were computed for (i) the whole
epoch (WE) (i.e., the entire scanning session), (ii) the first 30-
s emotional block within each session (E1), and (iii) the first
30-s neutral block within each session (N1). As the experiment
progresses, the likelihood of SCR responses in subsequent
blocks being contaminated by responses to stimuli from earlier
blocks increases. Therefore, SCR variables were not computed
for individual blocks occurring after the first emotional and
neutral blocks of each session. This resulted in a total of
9 SCR variables designated as WEflucs, WEamp, WEmean
(whole epoch fluctuations, maximum amplitude, and mean
SCR), E1flucs, E1amp, E1mean (the same variables computed for
the first 30-s emotional block), and N1flucs, N1amp, N1mean
(the same variables for the first 30-s neutral block).
Initial exploratory statistics performed on these nine
variables, subdivided by group, showed that these data exhibited
considerable variance that violated the assumptions of normality,
even after log transformation. This was largely due to the data
being positively skewed (e.g., four of the 14 DPD patients at
time 1 showed no fluctuations greater than 0.02 microsiemens
across the entire scanning epoch, meaning that for this group
the distribution of values is skewed to the right of the normal
distribution curve). For this reason, non-parametric tests were
used to compare within and across groups.
Within the normal control group (n = 25), two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to compare SCR responses
in the first emotional and neutral blocks of each scanning epoch
(E1 and N1, see above). Fluctuations in the initial emotional
blocks (E1flucs) were significantly greater than those in initial
neutral blocks (N1flucs; sum of ranks 34.5 for E1flucs, 118.5
for N1flucs, p = 0.041). There were no significant differences
in amplitude of highest fluctuation or mean SCL. Similar results
were obtained in the DPD patient group at time 1, n= 14, where
E1flucs was significantly greater than N1flucs (sum of ranks 0
for E1flucs, 28.0 for N1flucs, p = 0.017), with no significant
differences in mean SCL.
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FIGURE 5 | Group comparisons between controls and DPD patients at time 1. (A) Areas significantly more active in emotional phase in controls: coronal slices
showing extensive bilateral visual cortical activity. (B) Areas significantly more active in DPD patients: coronal and midline sagittal views showing location of anterior
cingulate cortex activation.
TABLE 8 | DPD patients: comparison between improvers and
non-improvers at time 2.
Size x y z Region Side p
AREAS ACTIVATED IN IMPROVERS > NON-IMPROVERS
55 −43 19 −7 Anterior Insula L 0.013
50 −7 −89 −18 Cerebellum L 0.016
25 32 −74 4 BA19 visual cortex R 0.029
AREAS ACTIVATED IN NON-IMPROVERS > IMPROVERS
101 14 −52 −29 Cerebellum R 0.003
15 18 −85 −12 BA18 visual cortex R 0.042
12 −36 −74 4 BA19 visual cortex L 0.026
All activations shown were in the emotional phase. 2vis cx, secondary visual cortex.
However, the key comparisons here are the group
comparisons between controls and patients. Here, for each
variable, group comparisons were performed using a Mann-
Whitney U test, and in view of the relatively small sample
sizes this statistic was corrected for exactness within SPSS.
These data are summarized in Table 2. Tests of significance
were one-tailed, as there was a clear a priori hypothesis that
patients at time 1 would show diminished autonomic reactivity
compared to controls. In the study by Sierra et al. (2002), the
only measure on which DPD patients were found to be more
reactive than controls was a shortened latency of response to
non-specific stimuli (clap and sigh), while latency of response
to aversive images of the type used in the current study was
prolonged in the DPD patient group, and DPD patients also
showed significantly reduced magnitude of SCR response
to such pictures. Non-specific stimuli were not used in the
current study, and latency of response was not computed as
the methodology allows only for computation of responses
across epochs or blocks, rather than response to individual
events. For these reasons, the hypothesis for the current study
was that at time 1, DPD patients would show consistently
reduced autonomic activity (as indexed by SCR) compared
to healthy controls, and this would be reflected across all
variable types (number of fluctuations, amplitude, mean SCR
level).
For all subsequent SCR data analyses, non-parametric tests,
corrected for exactness, were used, according to the rationale
above.
All group differences were either significant at the <0.05 level
or approaching that threshold.
Group Comparisons: DPD Patients at Time 2,
Improvers (n = 5) vs. Non-improvers (n = 5)
Here comparisons were made between improvers and non-
improvers at time 2. There were no significant differences
between the groups for any of the individual variables.
Functional MRI Data
Group Data: Controls (n = 25)
For healthy controls, the key within-group analysis was
the group-level comparison of regional brain activation in
response to aversive images compared to neutral images. Areas
significantly more activated by viewing aversive images were
cerebellum, bilateral visual cortical areas, bilateral dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, Brodmann areas 44 and 45), right
supramarginal gyrus. Areas significantly more activated by
viewing neutral images were cerebellum, left middle temporal
gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus, and left insula. These results
are summarized in Table 3 (in all fMRI data tables that follow, for
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FIGURE 6 | Areas significantly more activated in emotional phase in improvers compared to non-improvers at time 2. Crosshair projection centered on left
anterior insula.
TABLE 9 | DPD patients who showed a significant fall in CDSS score
compared at time 1 and time 2.
Size x y z Region Side p
TIME 2 > TIME 1
57 −26 −59 31 BA19 1vis cx L 0.008
34 −7 −70 −29 Cerebellum L 0.007
19 36 −63 31 BA19 1vis cx R 0.019
14 −47 −63 −7 BA18/37 2vis cx L 0.030
TIME 1 > TIME 2
21 47 4 15 BA44 DLPFC R 0.013
12 29 −26 −29 Cerebellum R 0.039
12 −51 −7 26 BA4 precentral gyrus L 0.036
Abbreviations as above.
each cluster the Talairach co-ordinates of the maximally activated
voxel within that cluster are shown) and Figure 1.
Group Data: DPD Patients, Time 1 (n = 14)
Areas significantly more activated by viewing aversive images
were areas of right lateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral primary
visual cortex, bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and left
medial prefrontal cortex. Middle temporal gyrus was significantly
activated by viewing neutral images in contrast to aversive images
(see Table 4 and Figure 2).
Group Data: DPD Patients at Time 2, Improvers
(n = 5)
Areas significantly more activated by viewing aversive images
were areas of bilateral visual cortex, left DLPFC, and left anterior
insula (Table 5, Figure 3). One large cluster in cerebellum was
significantly more active in the neutral phase.
Group Data: DPD Patients at Time 2, Non-improvers
(n = 5)
Areas significantly more activated by viewing aversive images
were areas of bilateral visual cortex, right DLPFC, right
VLPFC (Brodmann area 47), and cerebellum. For the reverse
comparison, one large cluster in cerebellum was observed
(Table 6, Figure 4).
Group Comparisons: Controls (n = 25) vs. all DPD
Patients at Time 1 (n = 14)
Findings from the controls vs. patients (at time 1) comparison are
summarized in Table 7 and Figure 5.
Group Comparisons: DPD Patients at Time 2,
Improvers (n = 5) vs. Non-improvers (n = 5)
For this comparison, time 2 data for DPD patients who showed
a clinically significant reduction in CDSS score (n = 5) was
compared with time 2 data for those patients who did not show
any such reduction. See Table 8 and Figure 6.
Comparison Between Improvers at Time 1 and Time 2
These data are summarized in Table 9 and Figure 7.
DISCUSSION
With regard to the rating scale data: it is unsurprising that
patients and controls differed significantly on the anxiety
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FIGURE 7 | Group data comparisons for improvers at time 1 and time 2. Areas significantly more active in emotional phase at time 1 shown in fire, areas
significantly more active at time 2 in blue. (A) Transverse slice at z = 26 with crosshair projection centered on cluster in R DLPFC. Note activation in similar contralateral
region. (B) Extensive posterior cortical activation at time 2 (> time 1). Transverse slice at z = 1, crosshair projection centered on cluster in L occipitotemporal cortex.
scale (SSAI) in view of the established relationship between
depersonalization and anxiety (Medford et al., 2005, although
DPD is not simply an anxiety disorder, see Sierra et al., 2012),
and similar anxiety scores have been found in previous empirical
studies of patients with primary DPD (e.g., Sierra et al., 2002).
With regard to scores on the BDI, although DPD patients scored
significantly higher than controls, it should nevertheless be noted
that within the patient group the mean score is still well below
the usual clinical cut-off, as are all the individual scores within
the patient group, with the exception of one individual scoring
30 and another with a borderline score of 17.
SCR data was analyzed along three axes (number of
fluctuations, amplitude of highest fluctuation, and mean SCR
level) for the whole scanning session and, in addition, for the first
30-s aversive and neutral stimulus blocks, giving a total of nine
dependent variables. Tests of the hypothesis that DPD patients
(at time 1) would be generally less autonomically reactive than
healthy controls produced significant results for five of the nine
variables, and non-significant trends in the same direction for
the other four variables. Taken as a whole, these findings provide
strong evidence to support the above hypothesis. It should be
noted that this effect was not specific to responses to emotional
stimuli: the findings from neutral blocks are similar to those from
emotional blocks. As discussed above, the study by Sierra et al.
(2002), found decreased latency of response to physical (non-
image) auditory stimuli (clap, sigh) in the DPD patient group
compared to controls. The authors interpreted this as supporting
a previous theoretical suggestion (Sierra and Berrios, 1998) that
in DPD there is an inhibition of emotional response combined
with a simultaneous state of heightened alertness or vigilance
(this latter aspect was not specifically examined in the current
study). However, in the same study, in addition to the finding
that DPD patients had diminished responsiveness to aversive
images, there was also weak evidence (not reaching statistical
significance) of diminished responses to neutral images in the
DPD patient group.
There is also older work supporting the idea that
depersonalization is associated with diminished emotional
arousal and autonomic reactivity. There are reports of
individuals with episodic depersonalization in whom periods of
depersonalization were associated with SCR response patterns
that were strikingly different (in terms of showing greatly
reduced amplitude, and lack of fluctuation) from SCR responses
recorded from the same individuals at times when they were
not experiencing depersonalization symptoms (Lader and Wing,
1966). Another study (Kelly and Walter, 1968) used forearm
blood flow as an index of sympathetic activity and found that
patients with depersonalization had the lowest baseline levels
compared to various other psychiatric patient groups. Thus the
finding of reduced autonomic reactivity in depersonalization is a
consistent one, and in line with the results of the current study.
Improvements in clinical state at time 2, as indexed by
CDSS score, were not, however, associated with any significant
change in SCR variables. No significant differences were seen in
individual SCR variables between improvers and non-improvers
at time 2, or when comparing SCR results in improvers at time
1 and time 2. Caution must be exercised in interpretation of
these findings, as these comparisons are between small groups
(two groups of five in each case). Keeping this caveat in mind, it
appears that while measures of SCR reactivity appear to reliably
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discriminate patients from controls, they do not appear to have
predictive value in terms of response to pharmacotherapy or
progress over time, and nor are improvements in clinical state
necessarily mirrored by corresponding changes in autonomic
responses. This may reflect the fact that at time 2, even those
patients who exhibited a significant fall in CDSS score compared
to time 1 nevertheless still had CDSS scores well above the
clinical cut-off for this scale, with only one exception. In other
words, four of these five patients still had definite symptoms
of DPD, despite having improved clinically to a significant
degree. The improvement appears to be reflected in changes
in neural activation pattern in response to the IAPS images
(discussed in detail below), but this is not mirrored by changes
in autonomic response. This suggests that the inhibition of
autonomic emotional response is a core feature of the DPD
syndrome which is one of the last aspects to “normalize”
when patients improve clinically, whether this improvement is
spontaneous or in response to specific treatment interventions.
Although patients who improved were designated as “improvers”
for the purposes of this study, it cannot be definitively stated
that their improvement was in fact due to the prescribed
pharmacotherapy. The study was not designed as a formal
treatment trial- rather it is an observational study of changes over
time in a group of patients, and the cause of these changes cannot
be definitely inferred. However, the response rate of 50% (among
the 10 patients who were re-scanned at time 2) is consistent
with a previous study of lamotrigine (either as monotherapy or
in combination with antidepressant medication) (Sierra et al.,
2006), and it should also be noted that all the patients had at time
1 reported chronic, intractable symptoms that had not responded
to any previous interventions.
In contrast to the SCR data, the functional MRI results
suggest a clear pattern of association between changes in mental
state over time and corresponding changes in regional brain
activity. At time 1, DPD patients showed significant activation
in response to aversive images in right lateral prefrontal cortex
(both ventrolateral and dorsolateral regions), bilateral primary
visual cortex, bilateral ACC, and left medial prefrontal cortex.
Visual cortical activations are frequently seen in functional
neuroimaging studies when emotionally salient material is
presented in the visual modality, as in the current study. This
is thought to reflect the “modulation” of sensory cortex by
back projections from areas involved in emotional processing
(e.g., Morris et al., 1998; Tabbert et al., 2005). This process
appears to still be in operation in the DPD patients, despite
their otherwise reduced biological and experiential response to
emotion. However, it is important to note that this modulatory
effect appears to increase when symptoms of depersonalization
are (at least partly) ameliorated. The evidence for this is that when
group data for improvers at time 2 was contrasted with equivalent
data from time 1 for the same subgroup of patients, there was
significantly more activation in visual cortical areas (primary
visual cortex bilaterally, and left secondary visual cortex) at
time 2. This suggests that the modulatory effect seen in visual
cortex at time 1 is less pronounced than would normally be
expected, and this is confirmed by the fact that at time 1, controls
showed significantly greater activation than DPD patients in
visual cortex bilaterally. These activations were large (70 and
55 voxels, respectively) and highly statistically significant (p <
0.01). In contrast, no visual cortical areas were more active in
DPD patients than in controls. However, in DPD patients at
time 2, the pattern of results in visual cortex is more complex.
Both improvers and non-improvers show bilateral visual cortical
activations at time 2, with different areas being significantly more
active in each of these two subgroups. However, it is of note that
in the responder subgroup, visual cortex was significantly more
active at time 2 than at time 1, suggesting that a reduction in
CDSS score is associated with increased modulation of sensory
cortex by emotional processing. It may be that as this modulatory
effect increases, different areas of secondary sensory cortex are
recruited, perhaps accounting for the different patterns of visual
cortical activity seen in the two subgroups.
A network of right prefrontal regions was activated by viewing
aversive images in the DPD patient group at time 1. This included
a specific region (falling within Brodmann area 47) of right
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. In a previous fMRI study of
DPD (Phillips et al., 2001), this same region was also found
to be preferentially activated in DPD patients in response to
aversive images compared to neutral images, and it was suggested
that this region may have a key role in an involuntary “top-
down” inhibition of brain regions involved in the generation of
emotional response. The current study provides further evidence
that this area plays a key role in the biological underpinnings of
the depersonalization state. Firstly, it was activated in response
to aversive images in patients at time 1, as detailed above.
Secondly, the same area was activated by viewing aversive images
in non-improvers at time 2, but not in improvers. This suggests
that lessening in the severity of depersonalization symptoms is
associated with reduced activity in this area during emotional
processing. The implication of this is that right BA47 is a critical
region for the inhibition of emotional responses in DPD. In
this context, it is interesting to note that the same region has
repeatedly been identified as an important inhibitory area in
studies that have examined voluntary regulation of emotion in
normal volunteers (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Ohira et al., 2006).
Taken together, these findings suggest that right BA47 is recruited
when emotional responses are inhibited, regardless of whether
this emotional inhibition is volitional (as in normal voluntary
emotional self-regulation) or not (as in DPD).
Other lateral prefrontal regions activated in DPD patients by
viewing aversive images were predominantly right-sided, with
BA44, 45, and 46 all involved. An area of right DLPFC was
significantly more active in DPD patients at time 1 compared
to controls. This suggests that, in addition to the area of right
VLPFC detailed above, more dorsal regions of the right lateral
prefrontal cortex are also involved in the inhibition of emotional
response formation in DPD.
Medial prefrontal areas, including bilateral ACC, were also
activated by viewing aversive images in DPD patients at time 1.
ACC is known to be a key area in the evaluation of emotional
salience and regulation of emotional response (Medford and
Critchley, 2010) and it might be seen as a candidate for an
important role in the inhibition of emotional responses in DPD.
The current study provides only partial support for this idea.
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ACC was activated in patients at time 1, but ACC activation
was not seen in either patient subgroup (improvers or non-
improvers) at time 2, nor did ACC emerge as an area of
significant difference between the two subgroups at time 2.
One possible objection to our study might be that the time
2 scan results could have been confounded by some effect
of lamotrigine on regional brain perfusion and therefore on
BOLD response, as there is one study suggesting that lamotrigine
may reduce the BOLD response to somatosensory stimulation
in rodents (Kida et al., 2006). More pertinent to the current
work, however, is a more recent study showing no significant
effect of lamotrigine on brain perfusion patterns in humans
(Shcherbinin et al., 2015), suggesting that any such confound is
unlikely. Furthermore, in a previous fMRI study of DPD in which
some patients were on lamotrigine and some were unmedicated,
subgroup analyses of unmedicated participants did not suggest a
confounding effect of lamotrigine (Medford et al., 2006).
The left anterior insula emerged as a key region in this
study. This region was activated in controls in response to
aversive images, and this finding is consistent with a large body
of literature implicating the anterior insula in the response
to emotionally salient (particularly aversive) material (Phillips
et al., 1997; Mataix-Cols et al., 2008; Meriau et al., 2009). Insula
activation was not seen in response to emotional images in DPD
patients at time 1. However, anterior insula was activated by
viewing aversive images in improvers at time 2, but not in non-
improvers at time 2, and the difference was statistically significant
when the two groups were compared. This provides powerful
evidence that a lack of anterior insula activity is related to the
diminished emotional responsiveness seen in DPD, and that a
“re-awakened” insula is seen when patients improve and de-
affectualization symptoms (and DPD symptoms more generally)
are ameliorated.
The insula is frequently reported as a key brain region in
processes relating to emotion and bodily sensation (Craig, 2009).
In particular it has received attention for its putative role in
interoception: “our ability to sense ourselves” (Damasio et al.,
2000; Craig, 2002, 2009; Damasio, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004;
Medford and Critchley, 2010). Interoception encompasses the
sensing of discrete bodily events such as heartbeats, in addition
to a more general sense of bodily state thought to rely largely
on sensation related to autonomic and visceromotor processes
(Farb et al., 2015). It is widely argued that this general feeling
state is closely related to emotional state (Craig, 2002, 2009;
Medford and Critchley, 2010). This relationship of interoceptive
processes to emotional state, in both healthy and clinical groups,
has been the focus of considerable empirical and theoretical work
in recent years (for recent reviews see Barrett and Simmons, 2015;
Farb et al., 2015). One influential conceptualization suggests that
ascending somatosensory information is collated and integrated
(“represented”) in posterior andmid insula (regarded as “primary
interoceptive cortex”) before then being “re-represented” by
anterior insula to generate a consciously accessible feeling state
(“how I feel”) (Craig, 2009): a “sense of the whole” or “sense
of the internal milieu.” Theorists differ according to how much
of a central role they attribute to the insula. For example it has
been suggested (Craig, 2009) that the insula may be the seat of
self-awareness itself, whereas a more recent formulation (Barrett
and Simmons, 2015) argues that insular cortex is rather one
of a number of interoceptive hubs, so that while it contributes
to interoception, it is not crucial for it. Certainly the former,
more dramatic, claim appears inconsistent with the fact that
case studies of patients with extensive bilateral insula damage
(Philippi et al., 2012; Damasio et al., 2013; Feinstein et al.,
2015) show that fundamental aspects of self-awareness (such as
the ability to recognize oneself, or to have apparently normal
experiences of agency) and emotional response are preserved
in such cases. However, the disturbance of self-awareness
encountered in DPD is of a more subtle type: patients retain basic
self-awareness, and do not become delusional, rather something
about the quality of self-experience has changed. Patients with
DPDwill often use the phrase “..as if ” when attempting to convey
their experiences of the depersonalized state (e.g., “.. as if I were
an automaton,” “.. as if the world were artificial”), a state in which
experience of both the self and the surrounding world feel oddly
attenuated. Thus work in DPD may provide a clinical sounding-
board for the notion that, while insular cortex may not be
essential for interoceptive experience, its activity is important in
some way that adds important higher-order experiential features
(Damasio et al., 2013), aspects of subjective experience that can
usually be taken for granted but which are compromised in
DPD.
It is interesting that in our sample, DPD patients showing
clinical improvement at time 2 showed no significant change
in their sympathetic arousal as indexed by skin conductance.
This suggests that their self-reported improved self-awareness,
and concomitant changes in neural activity, may not be
immediately related to changes in sympathetic arousal but rather
to other interoceptive changes—here it is worth recalling that
the bodily signals that contribute to interoceptive experience
are manifold, including autonomic, visceromotor, hormonal,
immunological, and humoral elements (Critchley and Harrison,
2013). With regard to interoception and DPD, a study of
heartbeat awareness in DPD found no difference in performance
between DPD patients and healthy controls (Michal et al., 2014),
but more recent work suggests some anomalies in the cortical
representation of bodily events in DPD (Schulz et al., 2015). In
any event, in DPD the alteration in self-experience may not be
best probed by studies measuring awareness of discrete events
such as heartbeats, as patient self-reports strongly suggest that
in DPD it is a more general sense of one’s physical being that is
somehow attenuated or compromised (Medford, 2012).
In this context, it is of particular interest that the insula should
emerge as critical in DPD: in view of its role in the generation of
feeling states, and the relationship between these and emotional
experience, diminished (or inhibited) anterior insula activity is a
plausible biological substrate for both desomatization symptoms
and the phenomenon of de-affectualization which is the explicit
target of this study. It may be, then, that the subjective alteration
of experience that is the core of the depersonalized state is rooted
in a lack of anterior insula activity. The fact that this lack of
activity appears to be amenable to treatment- or, at least, that it
is not fixed over time- is encouraging, as it suggests a potential
neurobiological target for future treatment strategies in DPD.
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